US Nuclear Deal with Iran

The US must to deal with Iran...

The unusual fear is gripping the Arab world namely that nuclear diplomacy may yet bring Iran and the US into a close regional embrace. This may seem comical given the legacy of mistrust separating the two nations. This concern among Arab rulers, fuelled by progress towards a final agreement on Tehran’s nuclear programme, may have some justification in history. The US has never been able to pursue arms control without delusion and has always insisted on sanctifying its negotiating partners, conjuring up moderates and searching for common ground. The challenge for Washington today is to defy its history and reach a nuclear agreement with Iran while negating the Islamic Republic Regional ambitions. The successive US administrations were seduced by the notion that a nuclear agreement could pave the way for grander geopolitical convergence. If the thorny nuclear issues could be resolved through cool-headed dialogue,, then the thinking went, then why not other proved a fools errand, as the Kremlin saw no contradiction between negotiating a treaty on arms limitation and invading Afghanistan. The US adversaries have always been more practical about arms control and have seldom forfeited their ideological claims for the sake of trade and reconciliation.

The US is seeking to leave its war-torn charge in Afghanistan and may yet need Tehran’s assistance for such a withdrawal. Once the two sides  have agreed  on the nuclear file, they could move towards a large canvass of cooperation. These main sober strategic arguments are seemingly buttressed by the rise of pragmatists led by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

The US task remains imposing stringent limits on Iran’s nuclear programme through negotiations while restraining Tehran’s regional ambitions through pressure. This latter goal will require mending America’s battered alliances in the Middle East. Strategic dialogues and arms sales can go only so far. The US cannot reclaim its allies confidence without being an active player in the Syria saga. It is sure that Syria’s opposition is fragmented and the rise of Islamist radicals is a troubling sign, but many are still committed to displacing taming Islamist militancy and they are worthy of western embrace and support. So the US exempts itself from this conflict, its other pledges ring hollow to a skeptical Arab audience. Too often tensions between the US and Iran have been attributed to technical disagreements over the scope of Tehran’s nuclear programme. For decades, diplomats have struggled to define just the right balance between centrifuges and sanctions relief. Those negotiations have taken place while Iran’s presidency has changed hands from reformers to hard-liners and now finally to pragmatists. At the core this conflict is ideological: Iran does not want to American to succeed and America should not want Tehran to prevail.  Iran’s assault on the Arab order will define the parameters of Middle East politics for some time to come. The first step towards a sensible Iran policy is to dispense with the illusion of detente that too often accompanies arms control diplomacy.