Pak India NSG
India’s NSG participation seriously
threatens the credibility of the NSG. After the first Indian nuclear test on May 18 1974, the US,
Canada , The Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the UK, France and the Soviet
Union joined hands to coordinate their nuclear export controls. All these seven
nuclear supplier countries were totally convinced of the fact that the Nuclear
non-proliferation treaty was not doing enough to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. The plutonium used in India’s nuclear test was diverted from the
safeguarded, Candu reactors supplied by Canada. The group of seven countries
met for the first time in 1975 in London and is thus popularly referred to as
the London group. In 1977 membership was expanded to 15 states and after the
9/11 attacks, the nuclear suppliers group emerged as the world’s leading
multilateral nuclear export control body that governs international trade of
nuclear related materials and technology.
The NSG’s original aim was to
supplement the nuclear non proliferation treaty which permits peaceful use of
nuclear energy but also prevents nuclear technology from being used for
military purposes. Yet in the light of major developments, particularly the increasing
nuclear proliferation outside multilateral controls, the NSG faces a host of
challenges ranging from big question marks on its credibility to a growing
debate about engaging nuclear states outside the NSG framework. In the course
of globalization the world’s nuclear industry is rapidly evolving into a system
of compels proliferation transactions involving independent financiers and
traders whose shady dealings are totally disconnected from the world of nuclear
trade controls.
India- Pakistan are also two nuclear
armed countries that are non signatories to the NPT, have expressed interest in
joining the NSG. However it is not easy to decide about accepting Delhi and Islamabad
into the NSG. The question of expanding membership will have to be decided from
the perspective of the NSG remaining fundamentally committed to the goals of
the NPT or developing into a group of state that is capable of engaging in
nuclear exports. Many countries have frequently complained that the NSG
constitutes a cartel of nuclear technology owners. Pakistan also demands a
civilian nuclear deal similar to the India-US accord that allows India access
to nuclear technology despite being a non-signatory to the NPT. However there
is not considerable diplomatic support in favour of Pakistan’s request due to
our poor non-proliferation track record. While conducting the research on
nuclear terrorism at a US based institute, it is raised this issue with many US
nuclear experts about whether the US should extend cooperation with Pakistan in
civilian nuclear technology. The experts opined that in addition to
proliferation threats, Pakistan due to its poor economic situation might not be
able to buy sensitive nuclear technology
even if the US agrees to any such kind of deal.
At the moment, it is certainly difficult
to predict the outcome of the debate over expansion of the NSG membership but
if a decision is taken in favour of creating an exception only for India has
the potential to render the NSG irrelevant to the detriment of nonproliferation
norms. How the NSG resolves this issue will inevitably shape its future role in
the future nonproliferation agenda.
