SAUDI ARABIA’S NUCLEAR RESTRAINT
Saudi
Crown Prince recently has just concluded an official by visiting to Pakistan
and after visiting some of defence experts are of the view that strong defence
experts are of the view that strong military ties between both the countries
now have a new view against the threat of a nuclear Iran.
The
tales of the Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s nuclear deal have been circulating in
the international media after the inexplicable according to the BBC
representatives, the Saudis could obtain atomic bombs at will from Pakistan. Western
analysis are now inclined to discuss regional security issues as the foremost
motivators for Saudi Arabia to procure nuclear weapons, and Pakistan is most
often cited as the country primed to export these nukes to Riyadh. As usual,
the allegations of a Riyadh-Islamabad nuclear arrangement are fantastic ideas
with no proof. In November 2013 Pakistan rejected a misleading that alleged
nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia also
rejected the allegation.
Theoretically,
if Iran joints the nuclear club, Saudi Arabia would perhaps be inspired to
explore some form of nuclear deterrence in reaction but the expectation that
Riyadh will acquire nuclear weapons swiftly-either by developing or obtaining
them with the illegal assistance of Pakistan – is probably incorrect.
Considering Riyadh’s contemporary security environment, it will be tremendously
challenging for the Saudis to develop nuclear capability domestically or
through purchasing nuclear bombs from countries such as Pakistan, since both
countries would face substantial political and economic backlash after such
trade.
If
it is considered the argument that security apprehension is a leading factor
for Riyadh’s quest for nuclear weapons then neither Saudi Official statements
nor any Saudi actions endorse that this factor is currently convincing Saudi
Arabia to seek a nuclear deterrent or that such has previously encouraged Saudi
Arabia to develop nuclear weapons. After Israel allegedly developed nuclear
weapons in the late 1960 for example the Kingdom did not rush to build the
bomb.
If
Saudis will want to proliferate then the United States – Saudi partnership will
come under further stress, perhaps to an irrevocable degree. Not only by
getting a nuclear arsenal will Riyadh violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it
will also breach a memorandum of understanding inked with Washington in 2008,
promising US assistance with civil nuclear power on condition that Riyadh would
not pursue sensitive nuclear technologies.
Saudis
‘s objective to uphold a robust association with Washington prevents it from
any desire to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore neither could Pakistan endure
international criticism nor could Saudi Arabia bear the cost of such a nuclear
trade.
Pakistan
respects global non-proliferation norms despite its emergent disparity and
discriminatory trends. Pakistan made a great effort in supporting the global
non-proliferation regime, rules and initiatives. Learning lessons from Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s independent proliferation network, the government of Pakistan
has taken extraordinary export control measures since the early 2000, which are
now amply recognized by the international community. The ideal that Pakistan
would be submissive to this nuclear trade simply to honour cooperation with
Saudi Arabia is no less implausible than Saddam Hussain who former president
Iraq arming al Qaeda with nuclear weapons.
The
establishment relations of Pakistan between Iran and Saudi Arabia are deterring
it from taking sides. There is no
Iran-centric strategic rationale for Pakistan leaders to transfer nuclear
weapons to the Kingdom. Therefore, Pakistan will always avoid such
collaboration which will initiate nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Both
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia do not have any advantage in nuclear copoperation. Precisely
possession of nuclear weapons could be disadvantageous because it will attract
international attention and engender suffocating sanctions. If Iran builds the
bomb, it will aggravate Israeli insecurity and prompt Saudi Arabia to ask for a
nuclear umbrella from the US. Regardless of the regional security environment
of the Middle East and Pak-Saudi historical connections the House of Saud is
eventually likely to turn to Washington once again if Iran acquires the bomb.
